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SOME ASPECTS OF THE 
BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGN AID 
October, 1969 
DP 77 
Discnchantm2n-t with fo:r'c:dgn aid is' shar-0c1 by both cfono:i."' wnd 1°ecipfont1 
comrt;,:•ies. The purpose of this pape:r.• is to e,tplo11e sorns: cif the sotn::•ces 
of this mood in the case of one la1:'ge c.ou1Yt1'.'y n Brazil~ which dtu'ing 19Glf,~67 
>.,c,.nked only behind India~ Pakistan and South Vietnam as a J'.'ecipient o:I: 
Y>t:,t ,:,;.• 1 1 •. • ~ •'"10,,p_·, · l■= 0IXic_a_ aiQ ~- nDo 
No attempt will be made to cover all aspects of the Bl:>crnilia.,! fm.0 eign.. 
aid e}tpel"ience; discussion will center on topics which have received 
relatively little emphasis in the aid literature. These include difficulties 
imposed by the initial conditions on the achievement of la:r•ge r•eal tz•,':l.nsfm:·s ~ 
the disconti.nuity of aid and its frequent changes of ohjectiv0s .Ii dislim-.,s.-::::m::•nt 
lags and the relevance of Brazilian experience to the progr,,am wn"sus 
pl"oj 0.ct deb ate. 
Brazil has relied on foreign sou1•ces during most post wa:t' years to 
finance cun°ent account deficits in its Ba.lance of Payments. 'I'he alge-
braic sum of those deficits fl•orn 1950 through 1960 ):'eached $2. 8 Billion; 
the corz'esponding figure :for 1961 th1"ough .1.968 was $1. 5 Billion~ Exto:rtnal 
Hnanc:i.ng has taken many forms, many of which cannot be labelle.d a.id. 
the Brazi.l:i.Rn bi:t1ance o:f payments.~•-~---. ,,....__. .....=.,. -="•...,.,~-=·~.-.:r......-.,,-.·~--~=<> 
Be:fm?O 1961 ~ rriarld.ng the birth of the Alliance fo::t~ Prog2:•2rrn ~ Brazil 
rel:i.,(;!d fo;;, its enternal financing mainly on p1"iva'tfi sources :1 including 
supplic1·s I c1"-c:dits t and on bilate1~a1 and mu.ltil..rtex'al public lnstitutioas 
lendirig at near connne1°cia.l r-ates,. such as the U.S. E,:por•t<Cmpo:r.t Bank 
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(IBRD). Pre-1961 experience left a legacy of financial commitments which 
had a marked influence on the post-1961 years, when aid became a more 
important element in external financing. A closer look at the pre-1961 
capital account is therefore Warranted. 
A summary of the Brazilian balance of payments during the 19501s 
is presented in Table 1. The net capital inflow represented during those 
years 17 per cent of merchandise imports and more than 5 per cent of gross 
fixed investment. Tha average figUiles hi.de oonsideroa.hle fluctuations .in 
the net capital inflow; cut'I'ent account deficits larger than $450 Million 
were registered in 1951, 1952 and 1960, while 1950, 1953 and 1956 witnessed 
current account surpluses. 
Net direct investments, going mainly into the rapidly expanding 
manufacturing sector, accounted for a substantial share of the capital 
inflow,·2 More remarkably, short term borrowing by the public and private 
sectors was roughly as important as direct investments as a source of 
finance. Large commercial debts, including important ones with oil 
suppliers, were run up, especially toward the end of the decade. The 
EXIMBANK and the IBRD were the major external public lenders to Brazil 
before 1961. The former authorized long term loans for more than $900 
Million, while the latter's gross lending to Brazil reached $267 Million. 
3 
Other medium and long term capital comes from suppliers' credits, many of 
which involved high financial charges. 
Interest payments on these debts became stiff; factor payments abroad. 
excluding those on direct investments, rose from an annual average of 
$23 Million during 1950-52 to 099 Million during 1958•60, Amortization 




Expm:-ts i f, o,b. $J.l>LJ-30 
Imports i G. i. f. •~l ~.ti-80 
Nc,;t non••fin.::ncial services and privc,te transfe11 s. 65 
Net incornr, payments on direct investments 79 
OthE::C net fa.ct01~ payments abroad 60 
_,$· isi+'~~~tc~2x~5:t<:.J; 17:t;t.?~ 
Capital Account 
P'tib~n·c='tr•~;·;:~;;;-ferc; $ 5 
Net direct investments .106 
Net short term capital 1 including ~~~ggi~sili~
8 
net short 97 
Medi um and long term capital t net 7'7 
· Loan drawings ($260) 
/unortii.2;;ati ons (=183) 
E:r.:eo1.~s an d. Om1.ss1.ons 30rn 
Sources: Basic data obtained fporn International. t'Jonntary -Fund~ Balance 
of Paynkmts Ye,:rC'book ( severa.1 issues). Negative sJgn _irnr;-fi.es 
a~crc➔bf-t":=m~'="-~~,~'='•T·:=,~= 
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that Brazil faced a serious foreign debt crisis. Debt service charges, 
including amortizations on medium and long term debt plus interest on all 
debt, rose from 13 per cent of merchandise exports in 1955, to an unusual 
44 per cent in 1960. 
The Alliance for Progress in Brazil, then, opened under peculiar 
conditions. Thanks in part to the net capital inflow, the country had 
been able to achieve from 1947 through 1960 an annual growth rate in its 
real Gross Domestic Product of about 6 per cent, with industry expanding 
at more than 9 per cent per annum. This was accomplished even though the 
1955-59 volume of all merchandise exports was 16 per cent below that of 
1948-49. But by 1961 the Brazilian external debt (including undisbUI'sed) 
had surpassed $3 Billion. 4 
External Financing during the Alliance for Prozyess years; An overall view. 
A summary comparison of post-Alliance Brazilian performance with 
that of the 1950's is at first blush somewhat disconcerting. It is not 
just that overall growth dropped from around 6 to less than 4 per cent 
per annum; more puzzling at first sight is the decline in the net capital 
inflow, as shown in Table 2, at a time when foreign aid was becoming more 
plentiful. 
Some forms of aid did become more plentiful to Brazil after 1961. 
As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). 
and the newly created Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), lent 
substantial sums to that country after 1961, and the U.S. Food for Freedom 
program and the World Bank group increased the level of their grants and 
loans. 
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When the 1960's are compared as a whole with the 19SO's, using 
aggregate balance of payments statistics, the main accomplishment of this 
increase in development loans and grants appears to be a tidying up of the 
Brazilian foreign debt. The short term commercial debts and supplieI'S' 
credits piled up during the 19SO's were either paid up or refinanced under 
better conditions, with the help of U.S. and multilateral lending institutions. 
A good share of the time of Brazilian economic authorities during the early 
1960 1 s was spent on short term debt management, or, in the phrase favored 
by financial writers, in keeping the country from "going bankrupt". 
Major agreements with a group of creditors (The Hague Club) on debt re­
schedulings were reached on May 1961 and July 1964. On both occasions 
creditors chose to keep Brazil on a "short leash", and the reschedulings 
served only as stop-gap measures. 5 But by 1967 the structure of the 
Brazilian foreign debt was much healthier than that of 1960; average 
conditions on interest rates, grace periods and amortization schedules were 
softer. The participation of suppliers' credits in total debt had 
decreased and short term commercial debts were being met regularly, the 
arrears having been liquidated. Debt service payments, in absolute amounts. 
were in 1967 no greater than what they had been in 1960; coupled with 
an expansion of merchandise exports, the debt service ratio was reduced 
to 34 per cent in 1967. 
All of this is pleasing. But one may wonder what would have happened 
if AID, IBRD and IADB loans had not been available in the amounts indicated 
in Table 30 One possibility is that Brazil would have had to "tighten its 
belt" further during the 1960' s, to meet its foreign debt obligations• 
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Table 2 
Brazilian Balance of Payments, 1961 through 1967 
(Annual averages, Million current dollars) 
Current Account 
Exports I f.o,b, $1,492 
Imports, c.i.f. -1.360 
Net non-financial services and private transfers 57 
Net income payments on direct investments • 88 
Other net factor payments abroad - 134 
Net Capital Inflow $.. 147 
Capital Account 
Public Transfers $ 25 
Net direct investments 131 
Net short term capital including changes in net short
term assets • 63 
Medium and long term capital, net 98 
Loan drawings ( $511) 
Amortizations (-413) 
E?'X'ors and Omissions .. 
Sources: As in Table l 
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Table 3 
New Loans and Grants to Brazil Authorized by Major Dono:ris 
(Annual averages; Million current dollars) 
u.s. Fiscal Years u.s. Fiscal Years 
1946 through 1960 1961 through 1967 
U.S. AID and predecessor agencies 





U.S. EXIMBANK long term loans 
U.S. Other Economic Programs 







World Bank Group 




Source: Agency for International Development, u.s. Overseas Loans and Grants 
and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, n.c.: 
1968J, pp. 33 and !'61. • 
"World Bank Group" refers to IBRD and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). Inter-American Development Bank loans include 
those of the Social Progress Trust Fund. EXIMBANK loans 
exclude $397.2 Million of refunding loans made by that institution 
to Brazil during 1961-65. 
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Argentina, after all, from 1963 through 1967 registered current account 
surpluses adding to $930 Million, under pressure of external debt obligations. 
It could thus be argued that the increase in external official inflows shown 
in Table 3 made possible a larger current account deficit, or a smaller 
surplus, than would have taken place in the absence of official assistance. 
The fact that such a deficit was during the 1960's smaller on the average 
than that registered in the 1950 1s could then be considered irrelevant. 
In other words, a country can be receiving aid, defined as grant and loans 
under concessionary terms not available to it from commercial markets, 
'h ' . . de f" . 6 However, unde~wit out necessarily registering current account icits. 
Brazilian political conditions (of which more later), the realistic 
alternatives to an increase in external official inflows were either a 
unilateral moratorium on debt servicing, or more debt rescheduling. The 
prestige and credit standing Brazil preserved in world financial circles 
by avoiding those alternatives can be credited to the availability of 
external official flows. To most Brazilians this is probably not a very 
exciting contribution of foreign aid. 
From the Brazilian viewpoint, the desirability of the finanoial 
juggling accomplished during the 1960 1s partly depends on the legitimacy 
of the old debts, and the economic and other conditions attached to new 
gross inflows. Little solid information exists on the suppliers' credits 
and commercial arrears accumulated during the l950's; the usual stories 
of high pressure selling with hints of corruption are heard. More funda­
mentally, one may question the desirability of mechanisms used in industri­
alized cotmtries first to promote their exports of capital and other goods 
-9-
by liberal use of official insurance and credit schemes, and then to pressure 
recipient countries to consolidate private bad debts thus generated into 
public debt. On both the exporting and importing sides, this system reduces 
entrepreneurial incentives to refine cost-benefit calculations and objectively 
7
evaluate commercial r!sks. The major responsibility for screening which 
suppliers' credit are accepted for official repayments guarantees naturally 
rests with the receiving country. But industrialized countries which 
officially encourage their exporters to aggressively push their wares are 
not without responsibility when the time comes to consider bad debts. 
The terms of the official flows going into Brazil during the 1960 1 s 
were on the whole more favorable, at least regarding maturities, grace 
periods and interest rates, then those of external credits received during 
the 1950' s. But at an aggregate level, it may be noted that the "tying" 
characterizing U.S. flows reduced their contribution to Brazilian debt 
management. Debt servicing is of course untied, and must be finance from 
the general pool of foreign exchange. While imports financed with tied 
aid presumably~ .foreign exchange for debt servicing, the substitution 
is not perfect, especially in the short run, and further taxes the accounting 
and financial ingenuity of economic authorities, diverting them from 
considering long term development problems. 
To summarize: During the Alliance years Brazil received substantially 
larger official inflows, or aid, but because of unfavorable initial conditions 
and Brazilian policy choices on how to deal with them, such inflows resulted 
in a lower transfer of real resources than had been accomplished during 
the 1950's. The net capital inflow from 1961 through 1967 amounted to 
-10-
about 11 per cent of merctandise imports and to less than 5 per cent of 
gross fixed investment. In per capita terms, or as a percentage of 
Gross National Product, its contribution seems even smaller. 
8 
The Continuity and Objectives of Foreign Aid 
Treating post-1960 years as a whole misses much of the difficulties 
surrounding foreign aid to Brazil. The major problem has been the 
political and economic unstability experienced by that country during the 
1960 1s. Decisions by both bilateral and multilateral donors have been 
taken with the political and economic short run very much in mind. 
After less than one year in office, President Quadros resigned in 
August 1961. Vice-President Goulart succeeded him, but under military 
pressure, a parlamentarian-type government was adopted, reducing the powers 
of the Presidency. On January 1963 a plebiscite confirmed, by a wide 
margin, a return to a full presidentialist regime. On April 1964, 
President Goulart was overthrown. Although since then the military have 
been in effective command of the government, several political crises 
have erupted, the most severe in December 1968. Economic policy emphasized 
stabilization during April 1964 to April 1967 (the term of President 
Castello Branco), and expansion since then. 
Before April 1964 U.S. aid programs followed a zigzagging course. 
buffetted by Brazilian political changes, and hoping in turn to influence 
them. The stop-go decisions of those years make dizzying reading. In 
May 1961, AID agreed to lend Brazil $100 Million in balance of payments 
assistance, as part of a package including the IMF, European creditors, 
EXIMBANK and the U.S. Treasury. The loan was suspended with Quadros' 
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resignation. Later on, however, AID agreed to release $75 Million from 
that loan between November 1961 and April 1962. Disenchantment with Goulart 
led to a new temporary suspension of ~urther disbursements, but the 
Bell-Dantas agreement of April 1963 led to the disbursement of the remaining 
$25 Million. Shortly after that date, AID gave up hope on the Goulart 
regime, and adopted an "islands of sanity" strategy, calling for cooperation 
with selected state governments (Brazil being a federal republic), autonomous 
public agencies, and private sector "to the extent that this was possible". 
Answering criticisms of the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) regarding 
project loans made before April 1964, U.S. AID admitted that " ••• overriding 
u.s. policy considerations ••• 11 and not just developmental criteria weighed 
9·1 . d • . k"heav1 yon its ecision-ma ing. 
The point was forcefully, although with some factual inaccuracies, 
expressed by Mr. Thomas C. Mann, then Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, testifying in Congress in May 1964: 
11 We were aware in January by the time I got 
there--! do not know how much earlier--that 
the erosion toward communism in Brazil was very 
rapid. We had, even before I got here, devised 
policy to help certain state. governments. We 
did not give any money in balance of payments 
support, budgetary support, things of that kind, 
which benefit directly the Central Government 
of Brazil. That was cut back under Goulart. 
In my opinion, sir, and I think this is the 
opinion of many people who are informed about 
Brazil, the fact that we did put our limited 
amount of aid in the last year of the Goulart 
administration into states which were headed 
by good governers we think strengthened 
democracy. 11 10 
Since April 1964, U.S. aid to Brazil became steadier and greater 
attention was given to economic~ rather than political criteria. Most of 
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the program, however, was aimed at supporting short term stabilization 
Talking early in 1969 about u.s. AID programs in Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia, Mr. James R. Fowler, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance 
measures. 
for Progress, stated: 
" On looking back, as I have recently, over the 
years of the Alliance in these major three countries, 
it seems very clear to me that conscious decisions 
were made that the resource input and the assistance 
in the first instance would go to try to bring some 
stability into these economies. 11 11 
The emphasis on inflation control was particularly strong in Brazil, 
where the cost of living rose by 89 per cent between the second quarters 
of 1963 and 1964. The major innovation in AID Brazilian activities, 
the program loan, became the key lever for supervising Brazilian use 
of its monetary and fiscal instruments. Between 1964 and 1968 finds 
from program loans were released only subject to quarterly reviews of 
Brazilian policy performance which AID judged satisfactory. After the 
April 1967 change in Brazilian administration, disbursements from program 
loans were in fact held up from July until the end of that year, due 
to disagreements between AID and the new Finance Minister on economic 
matters, showing that the quarterly reviews were no mere formality. 
Political considerations, somewhat different from pre-1964 ones, 
again interfered with the continuity of U.S. aid flows late in 1968. 
After the Brazilian military brushed aside on December 1968 some of the 
flimsy post-1964 constitutional legality, AID placed "under review" 
further disbursements from its last program loan (signed in May 1968), 
as well as project and sector loans which had previously been authorized, 
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but not signed. Disbursements from project and sector loans already 
signed, however, went ahead. 
Discontinuity in lending operations to Brazil has not been the monopoly 
of AID. As shown in Table 3, the EXIMBANK sharply curtailed its gross 
lending to Brazil during the Alliance years. The reasons for this behavior 
a,:,e not clear. During the early 1960' s the EXIMBANK apparently felt 
that too much of its portfolio was being taken up by this risky borrower. 
Later on, perhaps because of bureaucratic rivalries, it failed to coordinate 
its program with that of AID. The World Bank Group also followed a stop-
go policy in its Brazilian operations; from 1960 through 1964 it did 
not authorize a single loan to Brazil. This was followed by authorizations 
of loans amounting to a total of $251 Million from 1965 through 1967. 
The record of the IADB has been steadier; from 1961 through 1964 it 
authorized loans to Brazil averaging $56 Million a year, increasing to 
$101 Million a year from 1965 through 1967. Authorizations on the Food 
for Freedom program were often erratic, as in 1967, raising serious doubts 
in Brazilian minds as to their reliability. 
The stop-go authorization policies of the EXIMBANK and the IBRD 
yielded an ironic result. During 1961-63, when Brazilian economic policy 
wa.s presumably at its worst, net disbursements (gross disbursements to 
Brazil minus Brazilian amortizations) amounted to a total of $208 Million 
for the EXIMBANK and $26 Million for the IBRD. During 1964-67, when 
major efforts were made to stabilize the Brazilian economy, net disburse­
ments from both institutions were negative, reaching -$119 Million for 
the EXIMBANK and -$30 Million for the IBRD. 12 The withdrawal of these 
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institutions from the Brazilian scene during the early 1960's, further­
more, hampered rapid and efficient identification and execution of new 
projects after 1964. The variable lag of disbursements behind loan 
authorizations, especially important at a time when the aid pipeline 
was being built up, as it was in the early Alliance years, thus compounded 
the instability and unpredictability of actual aid receipts.
13 
Whether or not the political and economic judgements which gave 
foreign aid to Brazil during the 1960's its unstable and short run character 
were correct, it is reasonably clear that by so doing it sacrificed the 
contribution foreign aid can make to sensible long range planning, not 
to mention the more ambitious social reform targets also contained in 
the Charter of Punta del Eate. 
Loan Authorizations and Disbursements: 
A look at time profiles and implications for the grant-element. 
Standard calculations of the grant element in development loans 
implicitly assume that they are fully disbursed at the time the loan 
agreement is signed, or that repayment schedules begin to apply only 
14
after the funds are disbursed. However, while disbursements will 
in fact be spread out over several years, loan agreements typically specify 
that repayments of principal will begin x number of years (about 5 years 
for IADB and IBRD loans and 10 years for AID loans) after their signing, 
or at best after the first disbursements, regardless of the pace of 
disbursements. Although interest is charges only on the disbursed amounts, 
loans made by the IADB and the IBRD carry a "commitment charge", often 
of three-fourths of one per cent per annum, to be paid on the undisbursed 
-15-
15amount of the loan. 
Both the disbursement lag and the "commitment charge" reduce the 
grant element of loans below what is estimated in standard calculations 
by an amount to be determined in this section. 
In what follows attention will be centered on the grace period, 
assuming that loans are fully disbursed within that time. No change in 
the standard calculations for the post-grace period is necessary. 
Assume for simplicity that a loan is disbursed in equal parts 
throughout the grace period. Use the following notation: 
L face value of the loan 
q rate of discount 
G grace period (number of years) 
t time 
The present discounted value of the disbursements at the time of 
signing will be: 
G L e-qtdt = L (1-e-qG) 
1 o G Gq (1) 
The value of (1) is naturally lower than that of L. Assuming, 
G = 5 years 
q = 10 per cent 
Then the value of (1) will only be 79 per cent of L. In other 
words, this factor alone reduces the grant element of a loan by 21 per­
centage points. 
There is some offset to this by the fact that during the grace period 
interest will not be paid on the whole face value of the loan, but only 
-16-
onon its undisbursed amount. On the other hand, the penalty charge 
the undisbursed balance will chip away at that offset. 
The present value of interest payments during the grace period 
under the new assumption regarding loan disbursements will be: 
I G Lite-qt dt (2)
o.G 
Where in addition to previous notation: 
i = interest rate on the loan 
The present value of the penalty charges on the undisbursed amounts 
during the grace period will be·: 
G Z(L-Lt) e-qt dt ( 3) 
I O G 
Where the new symbol, Z, refers to the penalty charge. 
Combining (2) and (3) one gets: 
G [ (i-z) Lt+ ZL] e-qt dt 
I G (4) 
0 
This expression may be compared with the standard estimate of the 
present value of interest payments during the grace period: 
(5) 
If penalty charges were to reach interest rates the two expressions 
would be identical, 
Solving (4) one obtains: 
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Which can be compared to the solution for (5): 
(7) 
So long as Z is smaller than i, the value of (6) will be smaller 
than ( 7) , thus "putting back" some of the grant element taken away in 
equation ( l). 
Assume, 
i = 5 per cent 
Z = three-fourths of one per cent 
and other parameters as above, then expression (6) will become 
O.l06L. Expression (7) becomes 0.197L~ 
. In the nume~ical example given, then, the net effect of the new-
assumptions, as compared with the standard ones assuming instant dis­
bursements and no penalty charges, is to reduce the grant element by 
about twelve additional percentage points. In other words, if using 
standard assumptions the grant element of a loan was 75 per cent, under 
16
the modified assumptions the grant element will be 63 per cent. 
Table 4 summarizes the disbursement rates of project loans made 
to Brazil by the IADB (57 loans), IBRD (16 loans) and AID (39 loans), 
No institution had disbursed, on the average, more than 50 per cent 
of the principal of its loans two and a half years after the signing 
17
of the loan agreements. About eighty per cent or more of the principal 
became disbursed only after four and a half years following the loan 
agreement. These lags are to some extent inevitable: equipment has 
to be ordered, projects will run i~to unexpected technical snags, receiving 
countries may fail to put up their share of the funds at the required 
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time, etc. Bureaucratic delays by both recipients and donors, often 
complicated by policy disagreements, also add to disbursement delays. 
But regardless of their justification, it is clear that this type of 
development loan does not provide cash on hand like a bond sale does. 
A more realistic example of grant element calculations, with and 
without the wrinkle developed in this section, can be given taking into 
account Table 4. Assume an IBRD/IADB type of loan, with an interest 
rate of 5 per cent per annum, and a 5 year grace period followed by 20 
years of amortization of the principal in equal amounts. Using a discount 
rate of 10 per cent per annum, the grant element of that loan, using 
standard procedures, would be about 35 per cent. When a "commitment 
charge" of three quarters of one per cent, and disbursements of 10, 20, 
30 and 40 per cent of the loan for the first, second, third and fourth 
years following its signature are taken into account in the calculation, 
leaving other assumptions unchanged, the grant element drops by about 
18
half to 18 per cent. 
The experience with program loans and ether aid practices 
Not all loans to Brazil share the slow disbursement rates indicated 
in Table 4. AID program loans, in particular, have been disbursed more 
quickly (typically within two years), especially when no policy dis­
agreements arose between the Brazilian and the u.s. governments. This 
section will discuss other characteristics of U.S. program loans to Brazil, 
as well as the newer concept of sector loans, and other features of 
project loans. 
For many yeal."s ec'On.0.mists.. p.raised,~e• advantc3i~es of prog~m over 
project loans, especially in the context of development planning. More 
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Table 4 
Average Visb'UI'sement Profiles of Project Loans to Brazil 
(As Cumulated Percentages of Loan Principals) 
IADB IBRD AID 
Disb'UI'sements by December 31 of: 
Year of signature of loan agreement 6 l 7 
First full calendar year after agreement 21 9 24 
Second full calendar year after agreement 50 37 49 
Third full calendar year after agreement 70 63 76 
Fourth full calendar year after agreement 81 88 80 
Fifth full calendar year after agreement 88 96 90 
Sixth full calendar year after agreement 94 99 100 
Seventh full calendar year after agreement 100 99 100 
Sources and Method: For the IADB, the calculation includes loans made from 
Ordinary Resources, Special Operations and Social Trust Fund from 1961 
through 1968. Basic data obtained from the Annual Reports of that institution 
(Statements of Approved Loans). IBRD loans include those made during 
1958 and 1959, plus those granted from 1965 through 1968. The averages 
shown for this institution, therefore, are probably less representative than 
those for the IADB and AID. (IBRD loans made during 1958-59 were disbursed 
rapidly, while 1965-68 loans have had very slow disbursement rates.) Basic 
IBRD data obtained from its Monthly Statement of Loans, December issues, 
Mimeographed. Calculations for AID include only project loans made from 
1962 through 1968; basic data obtained from AID, Office of the Controller. 
Status of Loan Agreements, December issues. 
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recently, and reflecting Latin American experience, program lending has 
. l . . . 19 come under prof essiona criticism. It will be argued.in this section 
that Brazilian experience with AID program loans sheds not much light 
on the project vs program debate, The reason is that AID program 
loans to Brazil have little in common, except their label, to the program 
loans economists had in mind. 
From 1961 through 1968, program-type AID loans to Brazil worth $625 
Million were authorized and signed, of which $100 Million were granted 
before April, 1964. Those loans, however, given as general balance of 
payments support in the midst of difficult political conditions, generated 
much U.S. Congressional opposition to this aid form. Their major objectives· 
appear to have been political, rather than economic. Partly to persuade 
the U,S. Congress that finds would not be wasted, post-1964 program 
loans were accompanied by a system of quarterly review, to which reference 
has been made earlier. Latin American program loans took on a character 
different from those made to the more "reliable" India. Those reviews, 
replaced since 1968 by semi-annual sessions, often involved as many as 
thirty people on each the U.S. and the Brazilian side, and went into 
many detailed aspects of Brazilian economic policy, even though AID had 
other ways of obtaining desired information, Many Brazilian officials 
found them not only humiliating, but also counterproductive.
20 They 
created an atmosphere encouraging rationalizations and double-talk, 
not very conducive to frank discussions of aid and development policies. 
The reviews concentrated on monetary and fiscal instruments, including 
exchange rate policy, rather than on targets, in a fashion not unlike 
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that of the Inte1~n2tic:aal Monetary Fund (IMF), To many, in fact, AID 
program loa.ns differed from IMF stand-by agreements only in the much 
more generous financial conditions involved in the former, with the off­
setting cost that the latter involve review sessions only once a year, 
and with officials who stay in the counti~y just a few days, Instead 
of the yea:rily "letters of intention" requiried by the IMF stand-by, 
Brazilian letters to the Ch&i:i."man of the Inter-American Committee for 
the Alliance for Progress, with detailed quantitative targets in the 
fields of credit and fiscal policy, accompanied the AID program loans, 
In other words, instead of committing program loans to support a five 
year development plan, AID used one year pledges to back one-year financial 
and fiscal policy packages. To paraphrase Hirschman-Bird, AID program 
loans attempted to reward vi:r•tue of a very particular and fragile species. 
Under pressure fa•om the U.S. Treasury Department, and much to the 
annoyance of AID, 17additionality" requirements, aimed at going beyond 
standard tying porcedures and assuring that program loan dollars would 
be spent on ~~ditional Brazilian imports from the U.S., further complicated 
progr•am J.02.n reviews. Paradoxically, at a time when the U.S. was promoting 
the liberalization o:f the Brazilian import and exchange control system, 
special regulations had to be introduced by Brazil to encourage the 
divorsio:·1 of import demand toward U.S. sources. These regulations went 
against the spirit, if not the letter, of post war agreements against 
trade discriminations. For example, six months credits at low rates of 
inte~est (negative in real terms) were granted to importers of certain 
narrowly specified goods, which happened to be available only in the U.S. 
Since the adoption of a fJ.c:dble exchange rate, which is depreciated in 
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small but frequent doses by the Central Bank, importers of "allowable" 
U.S. goods were promised that they could pay for those imports at the 
going spot exchange rate, even though imports were not likely to materialize 
in six or more months. Other impor>ters, of course, would have to pay 
a premium on forward dollars to cover themselves against exchange risks. 
"Allowable" imports from the U.S. we:r:ie :r:iegulated until 1968 by an 
extensive negative list, naturally including, besides luxury goods, 
commodities for which the U.S. already enjoyed a lar>ge share of the 
Brazilian market. In 1968 the system was tightened by the change to a 
positive list of allowed imports, increasing the time devoted by Brazilian 
and AID officials to wrestling with U.S. T:r:ieasu:r:iy officials over which 
goods could or> could not be impor>ted. A good day in aid administration 
became one when AID could convince the Treasury that usual Brazilian 
impor>ts from Chile should be left out of the positive list. •~Additionality" 
was finally abolished in June, 1969. 
It appear>s that the implementation of "additionality" caused in 
Brazil less problems than it did in Chile and Colombia. Incentives 
to importer>s of u.s. goods were so strong that funds moved quickly, unlike 
Chile, where program loans funds have gone unspent on several occasions. 
For whatever reasons, which may include the Brazilian import liberalization 
program and its impact on imports of durable consumer goods, the U.S. 
share in total Brazilian imports rose from 32.3 per cent during 1961-65 
to 36.7 per cent in 1966-67. Detailed data are not yet available to 
ju.dge the extent to which this was the result of trade diversion induced 
by tying and additionality. But one real cost of "additionality", perhaps 
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its greatest~ is clear: it used up an inordinate share of the time of 
both Br2zilian and U.S. officials denling with aid, and reduced the 
credibility of AID officials arguing that the funds were given to promote 
Brazilian development. This is a far cry from the ideal program loan 
economists c-::,::-:,..::~ast with project lending. 
Defenders of the AID program loans argue that) given the mood of 
the U.S. Congress, only short term commitments keyed to anti-inflationary 
efforts, and surrounded by the paraphenalia of rigorous quarterly reviews, 
were politically feasible if aid to Brazil was to be raised quickly after 
April, 1964. It is further argued, somewhat paternalistically, that 
the review mechanisms have helped Brazilian planning (at least of a short 
term rn~asure), by forcing that government to marshall its data and thoughts 
regula!'ly, and by providing a platform for expert fo:r:,eign counselling. 
Although the alleged goal of these loans is not to force conditions on 
an unwilling government, but to strengthen the hand of the "good guys" 
within that government who without prodding agree with AID presc:r:,iptions, 
it is cc:'.1.sicer•ed that the "good guys" can benefit from the discipline 
of frequJ;:it 1•eviews and~ depending on the political climate, with the 
chance to blame foreigners for the need to take unpopular policy measures. 
Hirschman and Bird have pointed out the difficulties in these 2,rguments, 
difficulties which~ it may be added, become more serious when the policy 
debate tGkes place in a bilateral framework and deals with short run 
policies which are easily reversable. 
There is polite disagreement between AID and Brazilian officials 
rega:r:,ding the impact of post-April 1964 program loans on Brazilian economic 
policy m2.kfrg ~ especially during the first three years. Having sold 
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program loans to Congress at least partly on the basis of the "leverage" 
they give over short run macroeconomic policies, AID naturally likes to 
hint, with great discretion, that the loans gave the ''good guys" the 
critical margin to push through their policies. Brazilian left-wing 
critics of aid, of course, agree with this evaluation, which they express 
in a somewhat less polite language. The "good guys", in the Brazilian 
case an impressive group of economists, although grateful for the additional 
funds, usually claim the policies would have been the same without them. 
As far as an outsider can judge these subtle matters, the latter appear 
to have the better case, at least for 1964-67. In more recent years, 
the mechanisms of program lending may have played a more important role 
in strengthening the hands of those within the government wishing to 
maintain the momentum of the stabilization plan and to adopt a more 
l . 21flexible exchange rate po icy. Flexibility in the granting and speed 
in the disbursement of AID program loans to Brazil have been their most 
impressive features, which are consistent with their stabilization goals. 
In the early stages of the anti-inflationary program, as that adopted 
in Brazil after April 1964, those features can be particularly important 
in mitigating the harshness of the impact of austerity measures. Much 
of their potential advantages, however, were wasted. During 1964 through 
1966, Brazil accumulated a current account surplus of $230 Million dollars, 
while projections made during 1964 had expected substantial current account 
deficits of $300 and $400 Million were forecasted; in fact, 1965 registered 
a surplus of $250 Million and 1966 a deficit of $70 Million. The major 
surprise was the low level of merchandise imports, in turn reflecting an 
unexpected contraction in the levels of investment and general economic 
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activity. 22 As U.S. officials , worried about the U. S" .bal2.nce of payments, 
watched nervously, the assets of Brazilian monetary authorities, rather 
than Brazilian imports, rose steadily from $170 Million at the end of 
the second quarter of 1964 to $505 Million at the end of 1965. To 
avoid this embarrassing surge in reserves, plans to arrange for new debt 
rescheduling meetings in 1966 were abandoned, and substantial debt 
repayments were accomplished. 
23 Tied AID program loans were substituted 
for another form of short-term "program lending" having the advantage 
of freeing untied foreign exchange, i.e., debt rescheduling. The role 
of AID program loans as cushion against the negative short run effects 
of stabilization was much less visible. Per capita real absorption 
during 1964-66 remained at the levels reached during 1961-63 and~ if 
the national accounts are to be believed, the absolute level of real 
gross fixed investment fell by about 15 per cent between those two periods. 
Some urban real wages also fell during 1964-66, but this may have been 
limited to the best organized and paid urban workers. 
To summarize: Brazilian experience is more relevant to a discussion 
of· lending for stabilization versus lending for devt"l.cpmsnt ~ or more 
precisely, to the establishment of priorities among short an<l long term 
2L~
goals, than to the hoary project versus program debate. 
During more recent years AID has given greater attention to long 
term development goals, such as improving Brazilian agriculture and the 
educational and health systems. The macro leverage p:,:,o-;-icled by its program 
loans has been found unsuitable to promote sectorial reformsJ and a 
new form of lending, sector loans,.has begun to appear., 
25 Authorized 
(but unsigned) loans for secondary education and for the e~~2blishment 
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of a Brazilian national fund f()!t- wat~ end sewerage projects M'6 examples 
of this type of lending. As the direct import content of these activities 
is minimal, sector loans share with program loans the feature of providing 
foreign exchange, tied only to purchasing from the U.S. As Brazil has 
already developed a diversified capital goods industry, it may be noted, 
external financing of only direct import requirements of machinery and 
equipment has become an increasingly unsatisfactory way to transfer real 
resources into that country. In fact, a recent AID loan to finance 
U.S. capital goods into Brazil has moved slowly due to the keen competition 
(and political pressure) of Brazilian capital goods producers. In contrast 
with program loans sector loans include fewer but more pointed preconditions 
of a sectorial, rather than of a macroeconomic character. In this respect, 
they are closer to, say, project loans for electricity which carry as 
preconditions changes in public utility rates and the organization of 
public electrical enterprises. It is likely that institutions with ex­
perience in project lending, such as the IBRD, will expand more and-more 
into sectoral loans in areas like industry, agriculture and education, 
by liberalizing their policy on financing domestic costs while insisting 
on more general pollcy -0ommi tments • 
It is too early to evaluate t~ peirft,rmarice of sector 
loans in Brazil. They do get into more sensitive areas than project 
loans (education versus electricity), raising Hirshman-Bird difficulties. 
It is already known that negotiations over the secondary education sector 
loans have been slow and painful. They have been further complicated 
by the constitutional need to deal in this matter both with several 
state governments and with the federal government of Brazil. Other AID 
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plans to devise sectoral loans for university education aborted for political 
reasons. Although it is doubtful that this type of loan can succeed in 
transferring large amounts of resources and promoting badly needed insti~ 
tutional changes within a bilateral setting involving the U.S. and the 
26 ·· it represent s, at l east, an effort to use 
aid to support policy changes with substantial long run implications 
present Brazi·1·ian regime, 
(i.e., educational reform, which has been badly needed in Brazil for many 
years), rather than those which may be easily reversable (i.e. a few percentage 
changes in credit exapnsion or in the exchange rate). 
As indicated earlier, Brazil has received a large number of project 
loans from AID, IADB and IBRD during the l960's. Conspicuously absent 
from among donor institutions is the International Development Association 
(IDA), dispensing untied soft loans. This institution has ignored Brazil 
as too rich, leading some to facetiously recommend a secession of the 
As in otherBrazilian northeasi as a way to increase the inflow of aid. 
countries, project loans signed during 1961 through 1967 by the IBRD 
were predominantly for electricity, while those from AID, and especially 
the IADB, were more diversified.
27 The geographical diversification 
within Brazil of theetwo latter institutions is also greater than that 
of the IBRD, which has concentrated its activities in the relatively 
prosperous south. But more recently the trend is for the portfolio of 
these institutions to become less differentiated, as the IBRD gets ready to 
expand into transport, industry, agriculture and social sectors, while 
the IADB, its Social Trust Fu~d exhausted, increases its loans into 
traditional social overhead fields 
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If project loans made during 1961 through 1967 by these institutions 
are part of a coordinated development strategy, that strategy is not at 
all obvious. Lack, until very recently, of a Brazilian long range development 
plan, and the understandable Brazilian reluctance to have those loans co­
ordinated by collusion among foreign institutions (some of which takes 
place, anyway) 1 partly account for the ~ ~ procedures used to evaluate 
projects by each lender. Well known tying procedures on AID and many 
IADB loans, the impact of which could only by mitigated in part by Brazilian 
maneuvering as to where different projects were to be financed, reduced 
their economic value and biased investment policies. U.S. legislation 
requiring that at least SO per cent of the tonnage financed by AID loans 
be shipped on u.s. vessels, for example, caused serious delays during 
1964-56 for at least one AID fertilizer loan, as a result of which a crop­
year was missed. Projects involving large direct imports from the u.s., 
such as capital-intensive highway maintenance, which opened possibilities 
of diverting Brazilian imports from Western Europe toward the U.S., tended 
to be favored over higher priority projects involving a high share of local 
costs. These biases received their main support, it should be noted, 
from the u.s. Treasury. 
More generally, the fact that until very recently bilateral and 
multilateral donors concentrated their project lending on large infrastructure 
llllits, biased investment in their favor. Knowledge that external finance 
is more available for certain types of projects is bound to exert an 
influence over investment plans, especially bearing in mind the costliness 
of project preparation. Ideally, Brazil should have a plan whose priorities 
were established independently of external financing possibilities. In 
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that case, AID, IADB, IBRD, etc., could pick from the plan whatever projects 
and sectors they preferred to finance, each according to its own biases. 
But in fact, no such strong planning mechanism exists yet in Brazil, and 
the investment pattern ends up reflecting to a large extent lenders' ad hoc 
preferences. If those lenders fancy dams and dislike education loans, . 
Brazil will tend to invest in dams and neglect education. 
One of the best features of project lending, i.e., the encouragement 
it gives to sectorial project preparation, financial planning and institution­
building, also tended to perpetuate the traditional alloca~ion of project 
loans. Electricity grew increasingly attractive as a candidate for loans., 
while less traditional borrowers, such as education and health, had to 
wait for major policy changes before they could hope for a share of external 
fwids. Furthermore, th~ institutional strength generated by external 
support made it easier for the favored sectors to claim higher shares 
of domestic resources. Donor reluctance to lend to public enterprises 
engaged in manufacturing and mining has also contributed to investment 
biases, (and to occasional political frictions). In short, administrative 
ease, short run politics (including at least regional and national 
Brazilian politics, plus those within the U.S. government and others 
involving international agencies), and export promotion considerations 
seem at least as important as economic criteria in the explanation of 
which Brazilian projects receive external finance. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although this essay has attempted neither an exhaustive treatment 
of foreign aid to Brazil nop an analysis of Brazilian economic conditions 
during the 1960's, it may be misleading to finish without indicating some 
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of the realizations of post-1964 policies, A gradual reduction in the 
rate of inflation from its 1963-64 levels has been accomplished. Year­
over-year percentage price increases have been as follows: 
Wholesale index Consummer 
excluding coffee Prices 
1961 40 38 
1962 51 52 
1963 75 72 
1964 82 87 
1965 53 61 
1966 41 47 
1967 27 30 
1968 23 24 
Controlling inflation has taken longer than expected; the inflationary 
impact of correcting long distorted relative prices, or what has been 
dubbed corrective inflation, was underestimated. Supply responses to 
relative price increases were often disappointingly sluggish, while those 
to decreases were frequently quick. Yet since 1964 each year has witnessed 
lower inflation, and 1969 appears to continue this gradual trend. The 
creation of a new Central Bank and budgetary and fiscal reforms have 
expanded and improved the public sector instruments for seeking macro­
economic equilibrium, as well as for expanding public savings, 
Other institutional changes, such as the creation of a planning 
ministry and a central mortgage or housing bank, have improved the machinery 
for long term national and sectorial planning. 
Not without some setbacks and waverings, domestic relative prices 
have moved closer to reflecting real opportunity costs, making them better 
guides for resource allocation. Changes in poiicies toward foreign exchange; 
interest and public utility rates, plus a program of import liberalization 
started in 1966 which had helped to rationalize the protectionist system 
(although import duties remain high) have contributed to this purpose~ 
The domestic capital market was encouraged, and it is now perhaps the most 
active in Latin America. 
Measures to help the northeast, already started before 1964, were 
continued and extended. Indeed, the "aid program" of the Brazilian south 
to its north, relying mainly on tax incentives, dwarfs that of the rest 
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of the world to Brazii. 
Agricultural and export diversification have been encouraged, Non• 
coffee merchandise exports, which during 1962-63 averaged $615 Million 
a year, reached $1,028 Million a year during 1967-68. Finally, while 
the overall growth rate hardly stayed ahead of population expansion through 
1963-66, it has risen substantially during 1967-68~ The recovery of 
investment during recent years has also been strong~ 
These, then, are the major accomplishments achieved at respectable 
social, political and economic costs. Those costs have been borne unequally 
by different social groups, and masses of Brazilians have received little 
tangible irranediate help, or hope of future help, from the economic reforms. 
Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen how permanent they will 
prove to be. 
The role of foreign aid in inducing these reforms and softening 
their negative short run impact has been, as discussed earlier, very modest. 
But the clearest benefit to Brazil from aid received during the l960's, 
i.e., an improvement in its foreign debt situation, facilitates future 
Brazilian policies toward external financing which may avoid its p~st 
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short comings. Assuming the continuation of vigorous export promoting 
policies, and the strengthening of its planning mechanism, Brazil should 
be able during the 1970's to rely to a much larger extent on international 
private capital markets for external financing of either its program or 
needs. The other two large Latin American countries, Argentina and 
Mexico, have already started issuing long term bonds in world capital 
markets, while several less developed countries have recently obtained 
suppliers' credits (as well as the more desirable buyers' credits) 
under conditions which favorably compare with those now available 
from international organizations, thanks to tough bargaining and judicious 
shopping. The disbursement of these program and project loans are 
likely to be faster and involve less political friction than those 
given by major aid donors. Their degree of (ex-ante) tying will also 
be smaller, assuming that world capital markets will continue their process 
of expansion and liberalization started in the 1950's. 
Does this mean a partial retreat from the role for external financing 
envisconed in the Charter of Punta del Este? It does. A possible 
conclusion to this review of difficulties of foreign aid to Brazil would 
be to suggest the obvious ways in which it could be improved (put it 
on steadier, longer term basis, avoid political meddling and breathing 
down the recipient's neck,.increase the role of multilateral aid 9 
eliminate red-tape and tying, etc.). One could call for a return to the 
But there is littleprinciples and the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. 
reason to think that what worked badly in the 1960's will work much better 
in the 1970's. Large and semi-industrialized developing countries, like 
Brazil, and industrialized nations with thick capital markets, would 
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do well to ponder Professor C. P. Kindleberger's recent words: 
~In a world increasingly attracted by decentralization 
and local responsibility, the possibility of returning ·· 
to the impersonal forces of the international capital 
market inevitably suggests itself. If the complex 
apparatus of intergovernmental and governmental aid 
and lending is not working satisfactorily, perhaps 
the time has come to revive the mechanism which it 
replaced. If the second-best machinery is poor, 
can we repair the first-best?30 
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many aggregate consumption-investment mixes; the one in fact realized (and 
its corresponding level of national savings) will only become known long 
after the fact. Suppose that all projects undertaken in a given country 
have the same foreign project lending element, which will be disbursed 





proporticnal to domestic savings, something which cannot be said for 
program loans. 
Countries with large external debt servicing, however, can run into 
difficult administrative problems if gross aid inflows only come in 
project form, with disbursements subject to the vagaries of project imple• 
mentation, while debt obligations have to be met regularly with free foreign 
exchange (or "program repayments"). 
25. Counterpart finds generated by program lending were used, among many 
other things, to try to promote sectorial reforms. But in the attempt 
to achieve many targets with a single program loan, such efforts became 
ineffectual, and it became obvious that priority was given to the anti­
inflationary goals. PL-480 loans and grants would have been labelled 
"sector loans" in that, at least in theory, they were given on conditions 
that improvements were registered in Brazilian agricultural production. 
However, it is doubtful that they were used for that purpose. In fact, 
they discouraged Brazilian corn exports, by debitting them against PL-480 
wheat available to Brazil, ton for ton (Corn is a promising activity within 
Brazilian agriculture). They also tended to hamper agricultural integration 
between Brazil and Argentina, at a time when promotion of Latin American 
integration became U.S. policy. PL-480 wheat flow, however, has declined 
as a share of total Brazilian wheat imports, from about half during 1960-62 
to 30 per cent during 1963-66. 
An AID sector loan to Chilean education has met with few difficulties.26. 
But given the interest of the Chilean government in education, this may 
be a good example of the Hirschman-Bird point that program (or sector) 
aid is fully effective only when it does not achieve anything, except 
transferring resources. 
27. Expressed as percentages of total value of loans signed, the 
sectorial breakdown was as follows: 












Transport 5 21 
Housing 5 
Education 6 
Water, sewerage and health 21 3 
Multisector and other 8 7 
Data obtained from the CIAP Secretariat. IADB includes the Social Progress 
Trust Fund. 
28. Date from the IMF' s International Financial Statistics. 
29. See Albert o. Hirschman, "Industrial Development in the Brazilian Northeast 
and the Tax Credit Scheme of Article 34/18", The Journal of Development Studies, 
Volume 5, Number K, October 1968, pp. 5-29. Tue tax incentive scheme was 
established by law in December 1961, and modified 
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in June, 1963. Brazilian help to its own northeast is often given as 
a reason by AID and the IBRD for the relatively few loans these institutions 
have given to that part of the country. See New Directions for the 1970 1s: 
Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development, op. cit., p. 586, comments 
by Mr. William A. Bilis, of AID. Incidentally, the published versions 
of these hearings on U.S. aid are liberally sprinkled with "Security 
deletions". On the other hand, they provide some light reading, as in the 
following interchange between Congressman Gross and Mr. Ellis (p. 585): 
Mr. Gross. Earlier, one of you spoke of the Constitution of Brazil. 
That has been shredded a good many times, hasn't it? 
Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gross. A constitution does not mean to them what it means to us 
in this country? 
Mr. Ellis. The last constitution was that of 1967 and some of the basic 
elements of that have been suspended. 
Mr. Gross. We get a lot of coffee from Brazil, do we not? 
Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gross. We pay for it, do we not? 
Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. 
30, Charles P. Kindleberger, "Less Developed Countries and the 
International Capit~J. Market" (mimeographed). 
